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Today is an exciting and troubling time for American
historians. Rarely has the study and teaching of the nation's
past aroused such heated public debate. We in the academic
world should welcome this intense scrutiny, even as we deplore
the oversimplifications of both history and politics in
magazine features and instant best sellers decrying "political
correctness," "multiculturalism," and the "new history."
These debates reflect the enormous changes that have
swept over the study o£ American history in the past
generation. Increased attention to the experience of
previously neglected groups, such as women and members of
racial minorities, and to previously neglected subjects, like
the subfields of social history, as well as new methodologies
borrowed from other disciplines such as anthropology and
literary theory, have transformed our understanding of the
American past. They have also, some complain, sacrificed a
coherent sense of what has unified our nation. I respond to
these admonitions with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it
seems irrefutable that the new history paints a far more
inclusive, nuanced, and accurate portrait of the American
experience. I do not regret the demise of older
generalizations that claimed to distill the essence of the
American saga, even as they reflected the history of only a
single part of the American people. On the other hand, I
myself have written of the desirability of moving beyond a
portrait of the United States as a collection of fractious
racial, ethnic, and sexual groups, to an appreciation of the
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common themes that give coherence to the nation's past.
The debate over difference and commonality today, I
fear, threatens to become as sterile as that over conflict and
consensus a generation ago. We can transcend it only by
recognizing that these are not mutually exclusive categories.
Not only are both diversity and commonality intrinsic parts of
the American experience, they are symbiotically related to one
another. Thus, identification and appreciation of the common
themes of American history may not be quite so easy as some
writers have recently suggested. Not long ago, Lynne V.
Cheney, then chair of the National Endowment for the
Humanities, called on scholars to devote less attention to the
"flaws of . . . American history" (by which, I suppose, she
meant the history of groups that have not shared fully in the
promise of American life) and concentrate on the "truth" that
"belief in equality and freedom" has been the central theme of
the nation's past. More substantively, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., in his best-selling critique of current cultural politics,
The Disuniting of America, identified a common belief in the
inalienable rights to freedom and democracy as among those
central ideas that has "managed to keep American society
whole." I want to suggest today, however, that these concepts
are anything but unproblematic. The difficulty is not merely
that the United States has often failed to live up to its
professed ideals - - a failure of which Professor Schlesinger
is, of course, perfectly aware. More important, these failures
cannot be understood simply as aberrations in a Whiggish
progress toward ever greater liberty and human dignity, in
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which the expansion of Americans' rights can be understood as
the logical and necessary fulfilment of a vision articulated by
the founders but for historical reasons not fully implemented
by them. Rather, apparently universal principles and common
values -- like freedom, democracy, and the inalienable rights
of mankind - - have themselves been historically constructed on
the basis of difference and exclusion.1
Nowhere is this symbiotic relationship between
inclusion and exclusion, between a creed emphasizing a
commitment to democracy and freedom as universal rights and a
reality of limiting those rights to particular groups of
people, more evident than in debates over that fundamental
question: who is an American? This is an issue that agitates
American politics even as I speak. Last year, Gov. Pete Wilson
of California, a state in the grip of economic recession and
experiencing a massive population influx from Asia and Latin
America, proposed to deny American citizenship to children born
in the United States to illegal residents.2 This year, he is
making this demand a central part of his campaign for
reelection. Although evidently unaware that his proposal would
require abrogation of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment,
the governor did, at least, draw attention to the fact that
citizenship and nationality are once again topics of intense
public debate -- a result of the upsurge of ethnic, religious,
and linguistic particularism in Europe and the Third World and
the ever-increasing visibility of the multicultural character
of the United States. The latest in a long line of American
statesmen to substitute a nickname or diminutive for their
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actual first name in hopes of creating a false impression of
folksy populism, Pete Wilson is also not the first politician
to blame America's problems on an alien invasion or to propose
to redefine American nationality along racial and ethnic lines.
There is nothing new, at least in the United States, about
bitter conflicts over who should and should not be a citizen.
Perhaps the intensity of these debates arises from
the tension between the universal principles of what is
sometimes called the American Creed and the need to define
national identity. From the time of independence, American
political culture, unlike that of other nations, has been
predicated on abstract verities that ostensibly apply to all
mankind - - the inalienable rights enumerated in the Declaration
of Independence, the universal rationality and propensity for
self-improvement taken for granted by classical economics. Our
raison d'etre as a nation rests on principles that are
universal, not parochial. Yet the process of defining
nationality is inherently exclusionary. Nationalism always
involves defining a community or people in contradistinction to
outsiders. No matter how wide the "circle of we," most people
on earth will remain excluded from it. It is now almost
obligatory to refer to Benedict Anderson's celebrated
definition of the nation as a state of mind, "an imagined
political community," a construction or invention rather than a
timeless entity. The nation's borders are as much intellectual
as geographic. (Anderson, I may note, ignores the United
States almost entirely in his fascinating book, a feature
shared by nearly all recent general studies of nationalism,
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which are more concerned with Europe and postcolonial
nationalism in the Third World than the world's first
democratic national atate.) One needs to add, however, that
the process of imagining is itself contentious and ultimately
political. Who constructs the community, who has the power to
enforce a certain definition of the nation, will determine
where the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion lie. Rather
than being permanently fixed, moreover, national identities are
inherently unstable, subject to continuing efforts to draw and
redraw their imagined borders. "The history of freedom," a
scholar of British history has recently written, "is really the
history of controversies over its constructions and
exclusions." The same may be said of citizenship.3
In a society resting, rhetorically at least, on the
ideal of equality, the boundaries of the imagined community
take on extreme significance. Within the cognitive border,
Americans have long assumed, civil and political equality of
some kind ought to prevail; outside its perimeter, equality is
irrelevant. The more rights are enjoyed within the circle of
citizenship, the more important the boundaries of inclusion and
exclusion become. Since citizenship implies the ability to
enjoy the full benefits of American freedom, "who belongs?" has
long been the central question of American nationality.4
From the foundation of the American nation, of
course, the existence of slavery constituted not simply the
most vivid contradiction to America's professed ideals, but the
most impenetrable boundary of citizenship itself. Already
deeply-entrenched in the Southern states by the time of the
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American Revolution, slavery helped to shape the identities,
the sense of self, of all Americans, giving citizenship a
powerful exclusionary dimension. The value of American
citizenship, as Judith Shklar has argued, derived to a
considerable extent from its denial to others. The
Constitution's very language revealed that three distinct
populations co-existed on American soil. One was the Indians,
dealt with as members of separate nations and not counted in
apportioning representation in Congress. The Constitution
divided the non-Indian population into "people," and "persons,"
a seemingly innocuous distinction which, in fact, reflected
enormous differences in status and rights. "We the people,"
according to the preamble, created the Constitution and,
presumably, the nation itself. Larpr in the document,
however, reference is made to "oti parsons," apparently
existing outside the political community. These "persons," of
course, are slaves (although the word itself is studiously
avoided). By leaving the fate of slavery to the individual
states and mandating that the condition adheres to those who
escape to a jurisdiction where slavery has been abolished, the
Constitution virtually guarantees the future continuation of
bondage. Slaves, as Edmund Randolph later wrote, were "not. .
. constituent members of our society," and the language of
liberty and citizenship did not apply to them.3
What of those within the "circle of we?" The word
citizen appears in four places in the original Constitution --
in articles elaborating the qualifications for the President
and members of Congress and in the comity clause requiring each
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state to accord citizens of other states "all the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the several States." Nowhere
does the original Constitution define who in fact are citizens
of the United States, or what privileges and immunities they
enjoy. It is left to the individual states to determine the
boundaries of citizenship and citizens' legal rights.
Nothing in the Constitution limits the rights of
citizens according to race, sex, or any other accident of
birth. The Constitution does, however, empower Congress to
create a uniform system of naturalization, and the laws passed
in the 1790s to implement this provision offered the first
legislative definition of the boundaries of American
nationality. The very effort to establish a uniform
naturalization procedure marked a break, with the traditions of
Britain, where until 1844 only a private Act of Parliament
could confer citizenship upon a foreigner. Americans, however,
thought of their country as a refuge for those fleeing the
tyranny of the Old World, an "asylum for mankind, " as Thomas
Paine put it so memorably in Common Sense. Yet slavery
rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining the
American community. When the era's master mythmaker. Hector
St. John Crevecoeur, posed the famous question, "What then is
the American, the new man?," he answered: "a mixture of
English, Scotch, Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes . .
. . He is either a European, or the descendant of a European."
This at a time when fully one-fifth of the American population
(the highest proportion in our entire history) consisted of
Africans and their descendants."
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The naturalization law of 1790 confirmed this
racialized definition of American nationality. With no debate,
Congress restricted the process of becoming a citizen to "free
white persons" (a provision already included in the
naturalization requirements of several Southern states, and a
good illustration of how slavery, from the beginning, helped to
define the American way.) This limitation lasted a long time.
For eighty years, only white immigrants could become
naturalized citizens. Blacks were added in 1870, but not until
the 1940s did most persons of Asian origin become eligible.
Only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were groups
of whites barred from entering the country and becoming
citizens. Beginning with prostitutes, convicted felons,
lunatics, polygamists, and persons likely to become a "public
charge," the list of excluded cla*:..^  would be expanded in the
twentieth century to include anarchists, communists, and the
illiterate. But for the first century of the republic,
virtually the only white persons in the entire world ineligible
to claim American citizenship were those unwilling to renounce
hereditary titles of nobility, as required in an act of 1795.7
The two groups excluded from naturalization - -
European aristocrats and non-whites -- had more in common than
might appear at first glance. Both were viewed as deficient in
the qualities essential for republican citizenship - - the
capacity for self-control, rational forethought, and devotion
to the larger community. These were precisely the
characteristics that Jefferson, in his famous comparison of the
races in Notes on the State of Virginia, claimed blacks lacked,
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partly due to natural incapacity and partly because the bitter
experience of slavery had (quite understandably he felt)
rendered them disloyal to the nation. Jefferson still believed
black Americans should eventually enjoy the natural rights
enumerated in the Declaration, but they should do so in Africa
or the Caribbean, not the United States. For him, as for many
of his contemporaries, the concept of politics as an arena
where citizens left behind self-interest in pursuit of common
goals implied the desirability of a homogenous citizenry whose
common experiences, values, and innate capacities made the idea
of a public good realizable.*
Blacks formed no part of the imagined community of
Jefferson's republic. But no dream of "colonizing" the entire
black population outside the United States could negate the
fact of the black presence. Whether free or slave, their
status became increasingly anomalous as political democracy
(for white men) expanded in the nineteenth century along with
an insistently self-congratulatory rhetoric celebrating the
United States as a "empire of liberty," a unique land of
equality and democracy. Without a long tradition of history to
weld their country together, Americans emphasized the recent
past (glorifying the founding fathers) and the future (the
nation's God-given mission of spreading freedom throughout the
globe). Indeed, in a country which lacked more traditional
bases of nationality -- long-established physical boundaries, a
powerful and meancing neighbor, historic ethnic, religious, and
cultural unity -- America's democratic political institutions
themselves came to define nationhood. Increasingly, the right
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to vote became the emblem of American citizenship -- if not in
law (since suffrage was still, strictly speaking, a privilege
rather than a right, subject to regulation by the individual
states) then in common usage and understanding. Noah Webster's
American Dictionary noted that the term "citizen" had, by the
1820s, become synonymous with the right to vote. In America,
unlike Europe, "the people" ruled, and the "public" itaelf waa
essentially defined via the ballot. Hence, who was and was not
included as part of "the people" took on increasing importance.
Suffrage, said one advocate of democratic reform, was "the only
true badge of the freeman." Those denied the vote, said
another, were "put in the situation of the slaves of
Virginia."'
Various groups of Americans, of course, stood outside
this boundary. Dealt with by treaties and assumed, as a legal
fiction, to be citizens of other nations, Indians were not
generally held to be citizens of the United States even though
certain statues contemplated this possibility for those who
left their tribes and received land allotments from the federal
government. Women's citizenship was something of an open
question. Free women were certainly members of the imagined
community called the nation; indeed according to the prevailing
ideology of separate spheres they played an indispensable role
in the training of future citizens. The common law subsumed
women within the legal status of their husbands. But courts
generally (although not always) held that married women had a
civic status of their own. They could be naturalized if
immigrating from abroad, and a native-born American woman did
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not automatically surrender her nationality by marrying a
foreigner. (Not until 1907 did Congress, alarmed by massive
immigration, require American women who married aliens to take
the nationality of their husbands, a provision that remained on
the statute books until the 1930s.)10
In the nineteenth century, however, the public arena
was very much a male preserve; indeed as democracy expanded,
participation in politics became a defining characteristic of
American manhood. In both law and social reality, women lacked
the essential qualification of political participation -- the
opportunity for autonomy (whether the propertied independence
of the republican tradition, which enabled men to devote
themselves to the public good, or the personal independence
deriving from ownership of one's self and one's labor,
celebrated in the emerging liberal ethos.) Women were also
widely believed (by men) to be naturally submissive, by
definition unfit for independent-minded citizenship. Nature
itself, said a delegate to Virginia's constitutional convention
of 1B29, had pronounced on women an "incapacity to exercise
political power." The democratic citizen was emphatically a
male head of household, and it was rarely noticed that without
women's work in the domestic sphere few men would have enjoyed
the freedom to take part in the political arena."
If women occupied a position of subordinate
citizenship, non-whites were increasingly excluded from the
imagined community altogether. Slaves, oi course, were by
definition outside the "circle of we," and, in the South, in
the words of a Georgia statute, free blacks were "entitled to
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no right of citizenship, except such as are specifically given
by law." Apart from the ability to possess property, few
indeed were given. The North's black community on the eve of
the Civil War numbered a mere 220,000, or about one percent of
the region's population. Yet as the nineteenth century
progressed this tiny group was subjected to increasing
discrimination in every phase of its life. In most Northern
states blacks were barred from public schools, denied access to
public transportation, excluded from places of public
accommodation, and prohibited from serving on juries and in
state militias. The position of Northern blacks, said
Frederick Douglass, was "anomalous, unequal, and extraordinary.
. . . Aliens we are in our native land." Over a century later,
Malcolm X would say much the same thing with his customary
directness. "Being born here in America doesn't make you an
American. Why, if birth made you an American, you wouldn't
need any legislation . . . . They don't have to pass civil
rights legislation to make a polack an American." Malcolm X's
point was that despite prejudice against white immigrants, they
were always viewed as potential citizens. Almost as soon as
they landed on these shores, alien men became entitled to legal
equality, and eligible to vote.12
Democracy for whites, however, expanded hand in hand
with deterioration in the status of free blacks. In 1800, no
Northern state restricted the suffrage on the basis of race.
Most black men were poor, but those able to meet property
qualifications could vote alongside whites. Between 1800 and
1860, however, every state that entered the Union, with the
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single exception of Maine in 1821, restricted the suffrage to
white males. Moreover, as property qualifications for whites
were progressively eliminated, blacks' political rights became
more and more constrained. In 1821, the same New York
Constitutional Convention that removed property requirements
for white voters raised the qualification for blacks to $250 --
a sum beyond the reach of nearly all the state's black
residents. Sixteen years later, Pennsylvania revoked African-
Americans' right to vote entirely. By 1860, only five states,
all in New England, allowed blacks to vote on the same terms as
whites. In effect, race had replaced class as the major line
of division between men who could vote (and thus be regarded in
popular usage as citizens) and those who could not.11
Were blacks citizens, of individual states or of the
nation? Despite the naturalization law's exclusion, there
seemed no way to deny the citizenship of native-born free
blacks. Citizenship, however, was increasingly believed to
confer a variety of rights that most whites did not wish to see
blacks enjoy. The federal government treated them as, in
effect, resident aliens, generally refusing requests from free
blacks for American passports. Most Northern states appear to
have recognized the citizenship of free blacks, but at the
price of severing, in their case at least, the tie between
citizenship and anything resembling civil and political
equality. The logical peculiarities of the situation were
revealed in the political crisis of 1819-21, when Missouri
sought admission to the Union with a constitution establishing
slavery and excluding free blacks from the state. As a number
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of Northern Congressmen pointed out, this latter provision
blatantly violated the comity clause forbidding each state to
discriminate against citizens of other states. If
Massachusetts recognized blacks as citizens, how could Missouri
exclude them? Southerners responded, in effect, that whether
or not individual states recognized free blacks as citizens,
the comity clause applied only to whites. In the end a
compromise was reached, whereby Congress ordered Missouri not
to prohibit citizens of other states from entering, without
defining who such citizens were. Almost immediately, the issue
resurfaced when, in the wake of the Denmark Vesey conspiracy.
South Carolina decreed that black seamen arriving in Charleston
would be imprisoned until their vessels were ready to depart --
another violation of the comity clause, which Massachusetts
protested to no avail.'4
Not until 1857 did the Supreme Court offer a
definitive answer to the question of black citizenship. (By
then, four Northern states had adopted the same disputed rule
as Missouri, prohibiting all blacks from entering their
territory.) In the Dred Scott decision. Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney announced that no black person could be a citizen of the
United States. It was, ironically, because the definition of
citizenship mattered so much that Taney felt constrained to
produce his complex argument excluding blacks. America was a
land of equality, he insisted, with only one class of
citizens -- "members of the sovereignty," equally entitled to
their "liberties and rights." States could treat blacks in any
ay they chose, but no state could introduce "a new member" into
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the national political community. Blacks, the Chief Justice
went on, had not formed part of the "people" who created the
constitution, and had, in the eyes of the founders, been
"considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings. . .
They had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."15
The relationship between inclusion and exclusion,
between the expanding rights of white citizens and the
deteriorating condition of blacks, was symbiotic, not
contradictory. As the substance of citizenship expanded and
Americans' rhetoric grew ever more egalitarian, a fully
developed racist ideology gained broad acceptance as the
explanation for the boundaries of nationality. Unlike
republicanism, in which the citizen is or ought to be willing
to sacrifice private interests in the pursuit of the common
good, nineteenth-century liberalism seemed more comfortable
with the actual diversity of needs, experiences, and interests
of a heterogeneous population. But liberalism contained its
own thrust toward homogeneity. The liberal citizen is guided
by rational self-interest. Yet were all human beings capable
of disciplined self-governance? If not, then nature itself --
inborn incapacity, rather than human contrivance -- explained
the exclusion of blacks from citizenship rights. Of course, as
John Stuart Mill once asked, "was there ever any domination
which did not appear natural to those who possessed it?" Yet
Mill himself argued, in his great work, On Liberty, that the
right to self-government applied -unly to human beings in the
maturity of their faculties." Entire "races" of less than
"civilized" people lacked the capacity for rational action
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essential to democratic citizenship."
Mill's view was widely shared in the United States.
Perhaps this was inevitable in a nation whose economic growth
depended in large measure on the labor of black slaves and
whose territorial expansion involved the dispossession of one
non-white people, the Indians, and the conquest of the lands
inhabited by another, the Mexicans. The encounter with
Mexicans via the Texas controversy of the 1830s and the Mexican
War the following decade crystallized an emerging ideology that
grounded American citizenship in a racially-defined set of
virtues. These were the years when American historians - -
George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, and others -- constructed a
narrative of the American past in which Anglo-Saxon qualities
were said to constitute the essence of American nationality.
In this story, blacks made no contribution to American
civilization, and the Spanish and French-derived cultures of
the trans-Mississippi West, like Indians and Mexicans, were
simply barriers to be overcome in the onward march of Anglo-
Saxon progress. This rhetoric of racial exclusion suffused the
political language. Only the Caucasian race, insisted John C.
Calhoun, possessed the qualities necessary for "free and
popular government. . . . Ours, sir, is a government of the
white race." This sentiment was not confined to the South.
Much the same idea was expressed by Stephen A. Douglas in his
debates with Abraham Lincoln: "I believe this government was
made on the white basis. I believe it was made by white men
for the benefit of white men and their posterity for ever, and
I am in favor of confining citizenship to white men . . .
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instead of conferring it upon negroes, Indians, and other
inferior races." Although Whigs tended to be somewhat more
open to the possibility that non-whites could be assimilated
into the political nation, they too, were attracted to the idea
of racial and cultural homogeneity and to the idea that Anglo-
Saxon Protestantism was the unique seedbed of American freedom.
Even as this focua on "race" (in the nineteenth-century an
amorphous category amalgamating ideas about culture, history,
religion, and color) helped to solidify a sense of national
identity among the diverse groups of European origin that made
up the free population, it drew ever more tightly the lines of
exclusion of America's imagined community. Gone was the idea
of liberty and self-government as universal human rights, for
only some peoples were "fit" to enjoy the blessings of freedom
or capable of governing themselves."
This racialized definition of citizenship and
American nationality was challenged, of course, by
abolitionists, black and white, in the years before the Civil
War. The antislavery crusade insisted on the "Americanness" of
slaves and free blacks and repudiated not only slavery but the
racial boundaries that confined free blacks to second-class
citizenship. Drawing on eighteenth-century traditions of
natural rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the
perfectionist creed of evangelical religion, abolitionists
sought to define the core rights to which all Americans,
regardless of race, were entitled. In so doing, they pioneered
the idea of a national citizenship whose members enjoyed
equality before the law protected by a beneficent national
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state. Revising Crevecoeur, Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote of
America's destiny as the forging of a "new race" amalgamating
not only Europeans, but "Africans" and "Polynesians" as well.
Although far less egalitarian in their racial views than most
abolitionists. Republicans in the 1850s also insisted that
America's professed creed was broad enough to encompass all
mankind. While hardly a proponent of black suffrage or
equality before the law, for example, Lincoln explicitly
rejected Douglas's race-based definition of liberty, insisting
that the basic rights enumerated in the Declaration of
Independence applied to all peoples, not merely Europeans and
their descendants."
Thus, the crisis of the Union, among other things,
was a crisis of the meaning of American nationhood, and the
Civil War a crucial moment in which key elements of the
language of politics were reconstituted and their outer
boundaries redefined. The struggle for the Union produced a
consolidation of national loyalties and of the national state
itself. Inevitably, it propelled to the forefront of public
discussion the question, "who is a American?" "It is a
singular fact," Wendell Phillips wrote in 1866, "that, unlike
all other nations, this nation has yet a question as to what
makes or constitutes a citizen.""
Four decades earlier, during Spanish America's wars
of liberation, Jose de San Martin had proclaimed that the
empowerment of the nation state demanded a uniform definition
of citizenship, rendering previous divisions and exclusions
obsolete: "In the future the aborigines shall not be called
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Indians or natives; they are children and citizens of Peru and
they shall be known as Peruvians." In the United States, too,
the state-building process itself, coupled as it was with the
destruction of slavery and the enrollment of 200,000 black men
in the Union Army, threw into question earlier definitions of
nationality. "The defiant pretensions of the master, claiming
control of his slave," declared Senator Charles Sumner in 1864,
"are in direct conflict with the paramount rights of the
national government." The "logical result" of black military
service, another Senator observed in the same year, was that
"the black man is henceforth to assume a new status among us."
Indeed, emancipation and the raising of black soldiers were
themselves crucial moments in the wartime process of state-
building, which, by their very nature, linked the rise of
national power with the vision of a national citizenry whose
equal rights were enjoyed regardless of race. Even before the
death of slavery, the Lincoln administration effectively
abrogated the Dred Scott decision by explicitly affirming the
citizenship of free blacks. This stance was strongly seconded
by Francis Lieber, at the time perhaps America's leading
political scientist, who advised Attorney General Edward Bates
that there uould be "not even a shadow of a doubt" that blacks
were entitled to citizenship. As for Dred Scott, wrote Lieber,
"I execrate that opinion from the bottom of my soul."20
By the beginning of Reconstruction most Republicans
were agreed on two principles: "the national citizenship," as
one newspaper put it, "must be paramount to that of the State,"
and the emancipated slaves were entitled to the basic rights of
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American citizens. Precisely how to define these rights became
the focus of the political struggles of early Reconstruction.
Before the war. Republicans like Lincoln had insisted that the
principles of "free labor" -- the right to pursue a calling and
earn' a living without encountering onerous discrimination,
opportunity for social advancement, and command over the
"fruits of one's labor" -- differentiated the free society of
the North from the slave South. The destruction of slavery
fixed free labor principles as a central element of American
freedom. Free labor formed the basis of the first statutory
definition of American citizenship, the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which declared all persons born in the United States
(except Indians) national citizens and spelled out rights they
were to enjoy equally without regard to race -- the ability,
essentially, to compete in the marketplace, own property, and
receive equal treatment before the law. States could not
deprive an individual of these basic rights; if they did so,
state officials would be held accountable in federal court.
"American citizenship must mean something," the
measure's author, Sen. Lyman Trumbull, told the Senate, and in
constitutional terms, the Civil Rights Act represented the
first attempt to spell out the consequences of emancipation and
define, in Trumbull's words, "the inherent, fundamental rights"
of American citizens. Soon afterwards, Congress approved the
Fourteenth Amendment, placing in the Constitution the
definition of citizenship as birth on American soil or
naturalization, and prohibiting states from abridging any
citizens' "privileges and immunities" or denying them "equal
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protection of the law." . This broad language opened the door
for future Congresses and the federal courts to breathe
substantive meaning into the guarantee of legal equality.21
The Civil Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment said
nothing about the suffrage -- this remained a privilege, to be
regulated by the states, not a fundamental right of citizens.
Black spokesmen bitterly resented this exclusion, and in their
newspapers, conventions, and public speeches put forth
persistent claims for full recognition of their membership in
the political community. The country's very democratic ethos
made their exclusion all the more onerous. In a democracy,
said Frederick Douglass, to be denied the vote was "to brand us
with the stigma of inferiority." "To say that I am a citizen
to pay taxes . . . obey laws . . . and fight the battles of the
country, but in all that respects voting and representation, I
am but as so much inert matter . . . is to insult my manhood,"
he added. In 1867, spurred by the insistent demands of
African-Americans and deep dissatisfaction with the results of
President Andrew Johnson's Reconstruction policy. Congress
enfranchised black men in the South. Two years later, it
approved the Fifteenth Amendment, barring any state from milking
race a qualification for voting.
"The great Constitutional revolution . . . ,"
declared Republican leader Carl Schurz, "found the rights of
the individual at the mercy of the States . . . and placed them
under the shield of national protection." Transcending
boundaries of race and region, the statutes and Amendments of
Reconstruction broadened the boundaries of freedom for all
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Americans, requiring that the states respect the fundamental
individual liberties that the Bill of Rights had protected
against infringement by the federal government. Indeed it was
precisely because they represented so striking a departure from
the previous traditions of American law that these measures
aroused such bitter opposition. "We are not of the same race,"
declared Indiana Sen. Thomas Hendricks, "we are so different
that we ought not to compose one political community." Federal
definition of the citizens' rights and civil and political
equality for black Americans, declared President Johnson,
violated "all our experience as a people." His veto messages
sought to resurrect the racial boundaries of nationality that
Congress had abandoned. History demonstrated, Johnson
insisted, that only "white men" possessed the "peculiar
qualities" that equipped them for democratic self-government.
As for blacks, neither "mentally" not "morally" were they fit
for American citizenship.21
Reconstruction Republicans rejected this reasoning,
and insisted that blacks now formed part of the national
community. But their universalism, too, had its limits. In
his remarkable "Composite Nation" speech of 1869, Douglass
condemned prejudice against immigrants from China, insisting
that America's destiny was to serve as an asylum for people
"gathered here from all corners of the globe by a common
aspiration for national liberty." Any form of exclusion, he
insisted, contradicted the essence of democracy. A year later,
Charles Sumner, the Senate's leading Radical, moved to strike
the word "white" from naturalization requirements. Senators
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from the Western states objected vociferously. They were
willing to admit blacks to citizenship, but not persons of
Asian origin. Sumner's measure, remarked Republican Senator
Cornelius Cole of California, "would kill our party as dead as
a stone." In the end, instead of eliminating "white," Congress
added people of African descent to those eligible for
citizenship via naturalization. The racial boundaries of
nationality had been redrawn, not eliminated."
Nor did Reconstruction policy makers make any effort
to expand the definition of citizenship rights to incorporate
women. Congress intended to overturn the nation's racial
system, but to leave its system of gender relations intact.
Like race, claimed the postwar women's movement, sex was an
"accident of the body," an illegitimate basis for legal
discrimination. Reconstruction, declared Olympia Brown,
offered the opportunity to "bury the black man and the woman in
the citizen." Yet slavery's denial of blacks' family rights --
including the right to the man to stand as head of the
household and represent his family in political society -- had
been among abolitionism's most devastating indictments of the
peculiar institution. Even as feminists sought to reform the
:;titution of marriage to make it more egalitarian,
Republicans -- including many former slaves -- saw emancipation
as restoring to blacks the natural right to family life, in
which men would take their place as heads of the household and
women would return to the domestic sphere from which slavery
had unnaturally removed them.24
As is well-known, the feminist effort to gain legal
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equality and the right to vote fell on deaf ears in Congress.
In its representation clause, the Fourteenth Amendment for the
first time introduced the word "male" into the Constitution,
producing a bitter schism between advocates of blacks' rights
and those demanding woman suffrage. When women tried to employ
the Amendment's expanded definition of citizenship to press
their own rights, they found the courts singularly unreceptive.
In 1872, the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois law barring women
from practicing law; woman, said Justice Bradley, was confined
by nature to the "domestic sphere" and restricting her
occupational opportunities did not, therefore, violate the
principles of free labor or the equal rights of citizens. In
Minor v. Happersett. the Court rejected the claim that the
right to vote was intrinsic to citizenship. Citizenship,
declared Chief Justice Morrison Wa^e, was compatible with
disenfranchisement; it meant "membership of a nation and
nothing more."u
Virtually no Republican lawmakers, in fact, had
intended, in rewriting the Constitution, to invalidate
discrimination based on gender. The language of the Fifteenth
Amendment clearly left the door open for suffrage distinctions
based on grounds other than race -- a sign that in law,
citizenship still did not necessarily encompass the right to
vote. But the Court's argument in cases involving women
constituted a step in the progressive narrowing of the
boundaries of citizenship, a narrowing soon extended to other
groups as well. With the end of Reconstruction, the
egalitarian impulse faded from national life, and the imagined
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community was reimagined once again. The Supreme Court
progressively restricted the rights protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment and did nothing when, beginning in the
1890s, one Southern state after another stripped black citizens
of the right to vote.
The "failure" of Reconstruction strongly reenforced
the racist thinking that came to dominate American culture in
the late nineteenth century, fueling the conviction that blacks
were unfit for self-government. "A black skin," Columbia
University political scientist John W. Burgess would write at
the turn of the century, "means membership in a race of men
which has never of itself succeeded in subjecting passion to
reason, and has never, therefore, created any civilization of
any kind." The retreat from the postwar ideal of color-blind
citizenship was also reflected in the resurgence of racial
Anglo-Saxonism linking patriotism, xenophobia, and an
ethnocultural definition of nationhood in a renewed rhetoric of
racial exclusiveness. America's triumphant entry onto the
world stage as an imperial power in the Spanish-American War of
1898 strongly promoted such arguments linking territorial
expansion, national identity, and American destinty, all
wrapped in a discourse that exalted the superior qualities of
the Anglo-Saxon or, as it as sometimes called, Aryan race. As
in the 1840s, even critics of imperialism shared in this
outlook, opposing the annexation of Hawaii, the Phillipines,
Puerto Rico, and Cuba on the grounds that the inhabitants of
these islands did not possess the capacities peculiar to whites
and necessary for democratic citizenship. Even as Congress and
- 26 -
the Supreme Court stood by while the Southern states stripped
black men of the right to vote, imperialism tied American
nationalism more and more closely to notions of international
racial superiority, displacing in part the earlier
identification of the United States with democratic political
institutions (or defining those institutions in a more and more
explicitly racial manner).M
This language was applied by scientists and
sociologists not only to groups of whites whose growing numbers
alarmed self-proclaimed defenders of America's racial and
cultural heritage. "Lower races" - - a term that often included
the urban poor, the insane, and immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe -- were said to be impulsive and emotional, and
to lack the capacity for abstract reasoning (much as Jefferson
had described blacks a century t, . -i . The idea that many
immigrants (like blacks) were representatives of "servile"
races unfit for democratic citizenship legitimated renewed
efforts to narrow the boundaries of nationhood. The Exclusion
Act of 1882 prohibited for ten years the further entry of
immigrants from China and forbade courts to naturalize those
already here. Renewed in 1892, the law was made permanent a
decade later. In 1921 and 1924, in a fundamental break with
the tradition of open entry for whites except for specifically
designated classes of undesirables. Congress imposed the first
sharp numerical limits on European immigration, establishing a
nationality quota system that sought to ensure that new
immigrants would forever be outnumbered by descendants of the
old and that within a generation the foreign born would cease
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to be a major factor in American life. Until well after World
War II, applicants for immigration visas were required to
declare their "race," even if this meant nothing more, in fact,
than being Dutch or French.27
By the early twentieth century, with black
disfranchisement in the South, the exclusion of Asians from
entering the country, and the broad segmentation of immigration
and labor markets along racial, ethnic, and gender lines, the
boundaries and substantive content of American citizenship had
again been severely curtailed. Not until our own time would a
great mass movement reinvigorate the ideas of the
Reconstruction era and erase, permanently (one hopes) the
second-class legal status of blacks, even as nationality quotas
for immigration fell by the wayside. The triumph of a far more
inclusionary vision of American nationality reflected not so
much the unfolding of the immanent logic of the American Creed
as a set of specific historical circumstances -- the
discrediting of racialist ideologies by the struggle against
Nazism; the advent to positions of power in the political and
academic worlds of the children and grandchildren of the new
immigrants; the consolidation of a trade union movement
committed in principle and, to some extent, in reality, to
racial and ethnic inclusiveness; the deployment of the ideal of
America as an asylum for freedom as a weapon in the Cold War;
the rise of the civil rights movement; and, last but not least,
a rapidly expanding economy that appeared able to absorb new
waves of immigrants. Today, some of these conditions retain
their potency while others have already faded into history. It
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seems safe Co predict that in the twenty-first century, the
boundaries of citizenship and the definition of American
nationality will remain, as they have been throughout our
history, sources of social contention and political struggle.
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